linux/security/landlock/fs.c
<<
>>
Prefs
   1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
   2/*
   3 * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
   4 *
   5 * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
   6 * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
   7 */
   8
   9#include <linux/atomic.h>
  10#include <linux/bitops.h>
  11#include <linux/bits.h>
  12#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
  13#include <linux/dcache.h>
  14#include <linux/err.h>
  15#include <linux/fs.h>
  16#include <linux/init.h>
  17#include <linux/kernel.h>
  18#include <linux/limits.h>
  19#include <linux/list.h>
  20#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  21#include <linux/mount.h>
  22#include <linux/namei.h>
  23#include <linux/path.h>
  24#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
  25#include <linux/spinlock.h>
  26#include <linux/stat.h>
  27#include <linux/types.h>
  28#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
  29#include <linux/workqueue.h>
  30#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
  31
  32#include "common.h"
  33#include "cred.h"
  34#include "fs.h"
  35#include "limits.h"
  36#include "object.h"
  37#include "ruleset.h"
  38#include "setup.h"
  39
  40/* Underlying object management */
  41
  42static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
  43        __releases(object->lock)
  44{
  45        struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
  46        struct super_block *sb;
  47
  48        if (!inode) {
  49                spin_unlock(&object->lock);
  50                return;
  51        }
  52
  53        /*
  54         * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
  55         * to the underlying inode.
  56         */
  57        object->underobj = NULL;
  58        /*
  59         * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
  60         * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
  61         */
  62        sb = inode->i_sb;
  63        atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
  64        spin_unlock(&object->lock);
  65        /*
  66         * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
  67         * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
  68         * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
  69         * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
  70         */
  71        rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
  72        /*
  73         * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
  74         */
  75
  76        iput(inode);
  77        if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
  78                wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
  79}
  80
  81static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
  82        .release = release_inode
  83};
  84
  85/* Ruleset management */
  86
  87static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
  88{
  89        struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
  90        struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);
  91
  92        rcu_read_lock();
  93retry:
  94        object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
  95        if (object) {
  96                if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
  97                        rcu_read_unlock();
  98                        return object;
  99                }
 100                /*
 101                 * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
 102                 * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
 103                 */
 104                spin_lock(&object->lock);
 105                spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 106                goto retry;
 107        }
 108        rcu_read_unlock();
 109
 110        /*
 111         * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
 112         * holding any locks).
 113         */
 114        new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
 115        if (IS_ERR(new_object))
 116                return new_object;
 117
 118        /*
 119         * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or
 120         * hook_sb_delete().
 121         */
 122        spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
 123        if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) {
 124                /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
 125                spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 126                kfree(new_object);
 127
 128                rcu_read_lock();
 129                goto retry;
 130        }
 131
 132        /*
 133         * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
 134         * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the
 135         * related object.
 136         */
 137        ihold(inode);
 138        rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
 139        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 140        return new_object;
 141}
 142
 143/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */
 144#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
 145        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
 146        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
 147        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
 148
 149/*
 150 * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
 151 */
 152int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 153                const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights)
 154{
 155        int err;
 156        struct landlock_object *object;
 157
 158        /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
 159        if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) !=
 160                        ACCESS_FILE)
 161                return -EINVAL;
 162        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
 163                return -EINVAL;
 164
 165        /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
 166        access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0];
 167        object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
 168        if (IS_ERR(object))
 169                return PTR_ERR(object);
 170        mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
 171        err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights);
 172        mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
 173        /*
 174         * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
 175         * increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
 176         */
 177        landlock_put_object(object);
 178        return err;
 179}
 180
 181/* Access-control management */
 182
 183static inline u64 unmask_layers(
 184                const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 185                const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request,
 186                u64 layer_mask)
 187{
 188        const struct landlock_rule *rule;
 189        const struct inode *inode;
 190        size_t i;
 191
 192        if (d_is_negative(path->dentry))
 193                /* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */
 194                return layer_mask;
 195        inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
 196        rcu_read_lock();
 197        rule = landlock_find_rule(domain,
 198                        rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object));
 199        rcu_read_unlock();
 200        if (!rule)
 201                return layer_mask;
 202
 203        /*
 204         * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
 205         * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses,
 206         * regardless of their position in the layer stack.  We must then check
 207         * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
 208         * the last one.
 209         */
 210        for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) {
 211                const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i];
 212                const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
 213
 214                /* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */
 215                if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) {
 216                        layer_mask &= ~layer_level;
 217
 218                        if (layer_mask == 0)
 219                                return layer_mask;
 220                }
 221        }
 222        return layer_mask;
 223}
 224
 225static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 226                const struct path *const path, u32 access_request)
 227{
 228        bool allowed = false;
 229        struct path walker_path;
 230        u64 layer_mask;
 231        size_t i;
 232
 233        /* Make sure all layers can be checked. */
 234        BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
 235
 236        if (!access_request)
 237                return 0;
 238        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
 239                return 0;
 240        /*
 241         * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
 242         * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
 243         * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> .
 244         */
 245        if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
 246                        (d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
 247                         unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))))
 248                return 0;
 249        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
 250                return -EACCES;
 251
 252        /* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */
 253        layer_mask = 0;
 254        for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) {
 255                if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request)
 256                        layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i);
 257        }
 258        /* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */
 259        if (layer_mask == 0)
 260                return 0;
 261
 262        walker_path = *path;
 263        path_get(&walker_path);
 264        /*
 265         * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
 266         * restriction.
 267         */
 268        while (true) {
 269                struct dentry *parent_dentry;
 270
 271                layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path,
 272                                access_request, layer_mask);
 273                if (layer_mask == 0) {
 274                        /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
 275                        allowed = true;
 276                        break;
 277                }
 278
 279jump_up:
 280                if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
 281                        if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
 282                                /* Ignores hidden mount points. */
 283                                goto jump_up;
 284                        } else {
 285                                /*
 286                                 * Stops at the real root.  Denies access
 287                                 * because not all layers have granted access.
 288                                 */
 289                                allowed = false;
 290                                break;
 291                        }
 292                }
 293                if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) {
 294                        /*
 295                         * Stops at disconnected root directories.  Only allows
 296                         * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is
 297                         * reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
 298                         */
 299                        allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL);
 300                        break;
 301                }
 302                parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
 303                dput(walker_path.dentry);
 304                walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
 305        }
 306        path_put(&walker_path);
 307        return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
 308}
 309
 310static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
 311                const u32 access_request)
 312{
 313        const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 314                landlock_get_current_domain();
 315
 316        if (!dom)
 317                return 0;
 318        return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
 319}
 320
 321/* Inode hooks */
 322
 323static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode)
 324{
 325        /*
 326         * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by
 327         * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete().
 328         */
 329        WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
 330}
 331
 332/* Super-block hooks */
 333
 334/*
 335 * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
 336 *
 337 * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes()
 338 */
 339static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
 340{
 341        struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL;
 342
 343        if (!landlock_initialized)
 344                return;
 345
 346        spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 347        list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
 348                struct landlock_object *object;
 349
 350                /* Only handles referenced inodes. */
 351                if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
 352                        continue;
 353
 354                /*
 355                 * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g.
 356                 * from get_inode_object()).
 357                 */
 358                spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
 359                /*
 360                 * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE  to protect against a race
 361                 * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which
 362                 * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a
 363                 * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
 364                 * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
 365                 */
 366                if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
 367                        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 368                        continue;
 369                }
 370
 371                rcu_read_lock();
 372                object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
 373                if (!object) {
 374                        rcu_read_unlock();
 375                        spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 376                        continue;
 377                }
 378                /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */
 379                __iget(inode);
 380                spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 381
 382                /*
 383                 * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we
 384                 * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we
 385                 * will just wait for it to finish.
 386                 */
 387                spin_lock(&object->lock);
 388                if (object->underobj == inode) {
 389                        object->underobj = NULL;
 390                        spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 391                        rcu_read_unlock();
 392
 393                        /*
 394                         * Because object->underobj was not NULL,
 395                         * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee
 396                         * that it is safe to reset
 397                         * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.
 398                         * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
 399                         */
 400                        rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
 401                        /*
 402                         * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was
 403                         * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the
 404                         * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop
 405                         * walk.  Therefore the following call to iput() will
 406                         * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at
 407                         * least two references to it.
 408                         */
 409                        iput(inode);
 410                } else {
 411                        spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 412                        rcu_read_unlock();
 413                }
 414
 415                if (prev_inode) {
 416                        /*
 417                         * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference
 418                         * that we just set in this loop walk.  Therefore we
 419                         * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't
 420                         * disappear from under us until the next loop walk.
 421                         */
 422                        spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 423                        /*
 424                         * We can now actually put the inode reference from the
 425                         * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore.
 426                         */
 427                        iput(prev_inode);
 428                        cond_resched();
 429                        spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 430                }
 431                prev_inode = inode;
 432        }
 433        spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 434
 435        /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */
 436        if (prev_inode)
 437                iput(prev_inode);
 438        /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */
 439        wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read(
 440                                &landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs));
 441}
 442
 443/*
 444 * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem
 445 * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files
 446 * not previously allowed.
 447 *
 448 * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked
 449 * processes.  Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a
 450 * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide
 451 * access-control security policy.
 452 *
 453 * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount
 454 * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process.  Indeed, we could
 455 * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into
 456 * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point.
 457 * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically
 458 * inherit these new constraints.  Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons,
 459 * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag).
 460 */
 461static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
 462                const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
 463                const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
 464{
 465        if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 466                return 0;
 467        return -EPERM;
 468}
 469
 470static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
 471                const struct path *const to_path)
 472{
 473        if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 474                return 0;
 475        return -EPERM;
 476}
 477
 478/*
 479 * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which
 480 * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden.
 481 */
 482static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
 483{
 484        if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 485                return 0;
 486        return -EPERM;
 487}
 488
 489static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
 490{
 491        if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 492                return 0;
 493        return -EPERM;
 494}
 495
 496/*
 497 * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace.  It must
 498 * then be forbidden for a landlocked process.
 499 *
 500 * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root
 501 * directory of the current process.  Moreover, it can be used to restrict the
 502 * view of the filesystem.
 503 */
 504static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
 505                const struct path *const new_path)
 506{
 507        if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 508                return 0;
 509        return -EPERM;
 510}
 511
 512/* Path hooks */
 513
 514static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
 515{
 516        switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 517        case S_IFLNK:
 518                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
 519        case 0:
 520                /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
 521        case S_IFREG:
 522                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
 523        case S_IFDIR:
 524                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
 525        case S_IFCHR:
 526                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
 527        case S_IFBLK:
 528                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
 529        case S_IFIFO:
 530                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
 531        case S_IFSOCK:
 532                return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
 533        default:
 534                WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 535                return 0;
 536        }
 537}
 538
 539/*
 540 * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not
 541 * handled properly.  Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more
 542 * privileges by being accessible from the destination.  This is getting more
 543 * complex when dealing with multiple layers.  The whole picture can be seen as
 544 * a multilayer partial ordering problem.  A future version of Landlock will
 545 * deal with that.
 546 */
 547static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 548                const struct path *const new_dir,
 549                struct dentry *const new_dentry)
 550{
 551        const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 552                landlock_get_current_domain();
 553
 554        if (!dom)
 555                return 0;
 556        /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
 557        if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry)
 558                /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */
 559                return -EXDEV;
 560        if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
 561                return -ENOENT;
 562        return check_access_path(dom, new_dir,
 563                        get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
 564}
 565
 566static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
 567{
 568        if (d_is_negative(dentry))
 569                return 0;
 570        return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
 571                LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
 572}
 573
 574static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
 575                struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 576                const struct path *const new_dir,
 577                struct dentry *const new_dentry)
 578{
 579        const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 580                landlock_get_current_domain();
 581
 582        if (!dom)
 583                return 0;
 584        /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
 585        if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry)
 586                /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */
 587                return -EXDEV;
 588        if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
 589                return -ENOENT;
 590        /* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */
 591        return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) |
 592                        maybe_remove(new_dentry) |
 593                        get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
 594}
 595
 596static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir,
 597                struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode)
 598{
 599        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR);
 600}
 601
 602static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
 603                struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
 604                const unsigned int dev)
 605{
 606        const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 607                landlock_get_current_domain();
 608
 609        if (!dom)
 610                return 0;
 611        return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode));
 612}
 613
 614static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir,
 615                struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name)
 616{
 617        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM);
 618}
 619
 620static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir,
 621                struct dentry *const dentry)
 622{
 623        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE);
 624}
 625
 626static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
 627                struct dentry *const dentry)
 628{
 629        return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
 630}
 631
 632/* File hooks */
 633
 634static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
 635{
 636        u32 access = 0;
 637
 638        if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
 639                /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */
 640                if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
 641                        return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
 642                access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
 643        }
 644        if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 645                access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
 646        /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */
 647        if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
 648                access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
 649        return access;
 650}
 651
 652static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 653{
 654        const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 655                landlock_get_current_domain();
 656
 657        if (!dom)
 658                return 0;
 659        /*
 660         * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
 661         * return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
 662         * evolution.
 663         */
 664        return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
 665}
 666
 667static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 668        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
 669
 670        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
 671        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
 672        LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount),
 673        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount),
 674        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount),
 675        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot),
 676
 677        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link),
 678        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename),
 679        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir),
 680        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod),
 681        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
 682        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
 683        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
 684
 685        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
 686};
 687
 688__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
 689{
 690        security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
 691                        LANDLOCK_NAME);
 692}
 693