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   1<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   2<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN"
   3        "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.1.2/docbookx.dtd" []>
   4
   5<article class="whitepaper" id="LinuxSecurityModule" lang="en">
   6 <articleinfo>
   7 <title>Linux Security Modules:  General Security Hooks for Linux</title>
   8 <authorgroup>
   9 <author>
  10 <firstname>Stephen</firstname> 
  11 <surname>Smalley</surname>
  12 <affiliation>
  13 <orgname>NAI Labs</orgname>
  14 <address><email>ssmalley@nai.com</email></address>
  15 </affiliation>
  16 </author>
  17 <author>
  18 <firstname>Timothy</firstname> 
  19 <surname>Fraser</surname>
  20 <affiliation>
  21 <orgname>NAI Labs</orgname>
  22 <address><email>tfraser@nai.com</email></address>
  23 </affiliation>
  24 </author>
  25 <author>
  26 <firstname>Chris</firstname> 
  27 <surname>Vance</surname>
  28 <affiliation>
  29 <orgname>NAI Labs</orgname>
  30 <address><email>cvance@nai.com</email></address>
  31 </affiliation>
  32 </author>
  33 </authorgroup>
  34 </articleinfo>
  35
  36<sect1 id="Introduction"><title>Introduction</title>
  37
  38<para>
  39In March 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) gave a presentation
  40about Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) at the 2.5 Linux Kernel
  41Summit.  SELinux is an implementation of flexible and fine-grained
  42nondiscretionary access controls in the Linux kernel, originally
  43implemented as its own particular kernel patch.  Several other
  44security projects (e.g. RSBAC, Medusa) have also developed flexible
  45access control architectures for the Linux kernel, and various
  46projects have developed particular access control models for Linux
  47(e.g. LIDS, DTE, SubDomain).  Each project has developed and
  48maintained its own kernel patch to support its security needs.
  49</para>
  50
  51<para>
  52In response to the NSA presentation, Linus Torvalds made a set of
  53remarks that described a security framework he would be willing to
  54consider for inclusion in the mainstream Linux kernel.  He described a
  55general framework that would provide a set of security hooks to
  56control operations on kernel objects and a set of opaque security
  57fields in kernel data structures for maintaining security attributes.
  58This framework could then be used by loadable kernel modules to
  59implement any desired model of security.  Linus also suggested the
  60possibility of migrating the Linux capabilities code into such a
  61module.
  62</para>
  63
  64<para>
  65The Linux Security Modules (LSM) project was started by WireX to
  66develop such a framework.  LSM is a joint development effort by
  67several security projects, including Immunix, SELinux, SGI and Janus,
  68and several individuals, including Greg Kroah-Hartman and James
  69Morris, to develop a Linux kernel patch that implements this
  70framework.  The patch is currently tracking the 2.4 series and is
  71targeted for integration into the 2.5 development series.  This
  72technical report provides an overview of the framework and the example
  73capabilities security module provided by the LSM kernel patch.
  74</para>
  75
  76</sect1>
  77
  78<sect1 id="framework"><title>LSM Framework</title>
  79
  80<para>
  81The LSM kernel patch provides a general kernel framework to support
  82security modules.  In particular, the LSM framework is primarily
  83focused on supporting access control modules, although future
  84development is likely to address other security needs such as
  85auditing.  By itself, the framework does not provide any additional
  86security; it merely provides the infrastructure to support security
  87modules.  The LSM kernel patch also moves most of the capabilities
  88logic into an optional security module, with the system defaulting
  89to the traditional superuser logic.  This capabilities module
  90is discussed further in <xref linkend="cap"/>.
  91</para>
  92
  93<para>
  94The LSM kernel patch adds security fields to kernel data structures
  95and inserts calls to hook functions at critical points in the kernel
  96code to manage the security fields and to perform access control.  It
  97also adds functions for registering and unregistering security
  98modules, and adds a general <function>security</function> system call
  99to support new system calls for security-aware applications.
 100</para>
 101
 102<para>
 103The LSM security fields are simply <type>void*</type> pointers.  For
 104process and program execution security information, security fields
 105were added to <structname>struct task_struct</structname> and 
 106<structname>struct linux_binprm</structname>.  For filesystem security
 107information, a security field was added to 
 108<structname>struct super_block</structname>.  For pipe, file, and socket
 109security information, security fields were added to 
 110<structname>struct inode</structname> and 
 111<structname>struct file</structname>.  For packet and network device security
 112information, security fields were added to
 113<structname>struct sk_buff</structname> and
 114<structname>struct net_device</structname>.  For System V IPC security
 115information, security fields were added to
 116<structname>struct kern_ipc_perm</structname> and
 117<structname>struct msg_msg</structname>; additionally, the definitions
 118for <structname>struct msg_msg</structname>, <structname>struct 
 119msg_queue</structname>, and <structname>struct 
 120shmid_kernel</structname> were moved to header files
 121(<filename>include/linux/msg.h</filename> and
 122<filename>include/linux/shm.h</filename> as appropriate) to allow
 123the security modules to use these definitions.
 124</para>
 125
 126<para>
 127Each LSM hook is a function pointer in a global table,
 128security_ops. This table is a
 129<structname>security_operations</structname> structure as defined by
 130<filename>include/linux/security.h</filename>.  Detailed documentation
 131for each hook is included in this header file.  At present, this
 132structure consists of a collection of substructures that group related
 133hooks based on the kernel object (e.g. task, inode, file, sk_buff,
 134etc) as well as some top-level hook function pointers for system
 135operations.  This structure is likely to be flattened in the future
 136for performance.  The placement of the hook calls in the kernel code
 137is described by the "called:" lines in the per-hook documentation in
 138the header file.  The hook calls can also be easily found in the
 139kernel code by looking for the string "security_ops->".
 140
 141</para>
 142
 143<para>
 144Linus mentioned per-process security hooks in his original remarks as a
 145possible alternative to global security hooks.  However, if LSM were
 146to start from the perspective of per-process hooks, then the base
 147framework would have to deal with how to handle operations that
 148involve multiple processes (e.g. kill), since each process might have
 149its own hook for controlling the operation.  This would require a
 150general mechanism for composing hooks in the base framework.
 151Additionally, LSM would still need global hooks for operations that
 152have no process context (e.g. network input operations).
 153Consequently, LSM provides global security hooks, but a security
 154module is free to implement per-process hooks (where that makes sense)
 155by storing a security_ops table in each process' security field and
 156then invoking these per-process hooks from the global hooks.
 157The problem of composition is thus deferred to the module.
 158</para>
 159
 160<para>
 161The global security_ops table is initialized to a set of hook
 162functions provided by a dummy security module that provides
 163traditional superuser logic.  A <function>register_security</function>
 164function (in <filename>security/security.c</filename>) is provided to
 165allow a security module to set security_ops to refer to its own hook
 166functions, and an <function>unregister_security</function> function is
 167provided to revert security_ops to the dummy module hooks.  This
 168mechanism is used to set the primary security module, which is
 169responsible for making the final decision for each hook.
 170</para>
 171
 172<para>
 173LSM also provides a simple mechanism for stacking additional security
 174modules with the primary security module.  It defines
 175<function>register_security</function> and
 176<function>unregister_security</function> hooks in the
 177<structname>security_operations</structname> structure and provides
 178<function>mod_reg_security</function> and
 179<function>mod_unreg_security</function> functions that invoke these
 180hooks after performing some sanity checking.  A security module can
 181call these functions in order to stack with other modules.  However,
 182the actual details of how this stacking is handled are deferred to the
 183module, which can implement these hooks in any way it wishes
 184(including always returning an error if it does not wish to support
 185stacking).  In this manner, LSM again defers the problem of
 186composition to the module.
 187</para>
 188
 189<para>
 190Although the LSM hooks are organized into substructures based on
 191kernel object, all of the hooks can be viewed as falling into two
 192major categories: hooks that are used to manage the security fields
 193and hooks that are used to perform access control.  Examples of the
 194first category of hooks include the
 195<function>alloc_security</function> and
 196<function>free_security</function> hooks defined for each kernel data
 197structure that has a security field.  These hooks are used to allocate
 198and free security structures for kernel objects.  The first category
 199of hooks also includes hooks that set information in the security
 200field after allocation, such as the <function>post_lookup</function>
 201hook in <structname>struct inode_security_ops</structname>.  This hook
 202is used to set security information for inodes after successful lookup
 203operations.  An example of the second category of hooks is the
 204<function>permission</function> hook in 
 205<structname>struct inode_security_ops</structname>.  This hook checks
 206permission when accessing an inode.
 207</para>
 208
 209</sect1>
 210
 211<sect1 id="cap"><title>LSM Capabilities Module</title>
 212
 213<para>
 214The LSM kernel patch moves most of the existing POSIX.1e capabilities
 215logic into an optional security module stored in the file
 216<filename>security/capability.c</filename>.  This change allows
 217users who do not want to use capabilities to omit this code entirely
 218from their kernel, instead using the dummy module for traditional
 219superuser logic or any other module that they desire.  This change
 220also allows the developers of the capabilities logic to maintain and
 221enhance their code more freely, without needing to integrate patches
 222back into the base kernel.
 223</para>
 224
 225<para>
 226In addition to moving the capabilities logic, the LSM kernel patch
 227could move the capability-related fields from the kernel data
 228structures into the new security fields managed by the security
 229modules.  However, at present, the LSM kernel patch leaves the
 230capability fields in the kernel data structures.  In his original
 231remarks, Linus suggested that this might be preferable so that other
 232security modules can be easily stacked with the capabilities module
 233without needing to chain multiple security structures on the security field.
 234It also avoids imposing extra overhead on the capabilities module
 235to manage the security fields.  However, the LSM framework could
 236certainly support such a move if it is determined to be desirable,
 237with only a few additional changes described below.
 238</para>
 239
 240<para>
 241At present, the capabilities logic for computing process capabilities
 242on <function>execve</function> and <function>set*uid</function>,
 243checking capabilities for a particular process, saving and checking
 244capabilities for netlink messages, and handling the
 245<function>capget</function> and <function>capset</function> system
 246calls have been moved into the capabilities module.  There are still a
 247few locations in the base kernel where capability-related fields are
 248directly examined or modified, but the current version of the LSM
 249patch does allow a security module to completely replace the
 250assignment and testing of capabilities.  These few locations would
 251need to be changed if the capability-related fields were moved into
 252the security field.  The following is a list of known locations that
 253still perform such direct examination or modification of
 254capability-related fields:
 255<itemizedlist>
 256<listitem><para><filename>fs/open.c</filename>:<function>sys_access</function></para></listitem>
 257<listitem><para><filename>fs/lockd/host.c</filename>:<function>nlm_bind_host</function></para></listitem>
 258<listitem><para><filename>fs/nfsd/auth.c</filename>:<function>nfsd_setuser</function></para></listitem>
 259<listitem><para><filename>fs/proc/array.c</filename>:<function>task_cap</function></para></listitem>
 260</itemizedlist>
 261</para>
 262
 263</sect1>
 264
 265</article>
 266
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